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In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant attempts, among other 
things, to solve two problems about our knowledge of the world. First, how 
can we know any necessary truths about the world, such as the principle 
that every event must have a cause? Kant follows Hume in holding that 
unless we are able to know such necessary truths, and to justify them 
without recourse to experience, we will not even be able to know any 
contingent truths about the world, for these all make use of the necessary 
principles. Second, how can I know that things other than I exist at all? 
This radical doubt about my knowledge of the world had, of course, 
plagued philosophers ever since Descartes. Kant's strategy for dealing 
with both these problems is to repudiate the assumptions behind earlier 
modern epistemology, and in particular, the kind of distinction that 
Descartes and Hume had made between self-knowledge and our 
knowledge of 'outer' things. For Kant, this distinction as it stands is too 
simplistic, and it inevitably leads to skepticism about our knowledge of the 
world. But he still distinguishes self-knowledge from other kinds of 
knowledge; in fact, self-knowledge plays a crucial role in Kant's new 
epistemology. Kant's innovation is to distinguish sharply between two 
sides of what his predecessors understood as self-knowledge: 'inner sense' 
and 'apperception.' This paper will show how Kant's conception of 
'apperception' is meant to overcome Humean skepticism, and how 'inner 
sense' is meant to overcome Cartesian skepticism; I will then touch upon a 
complication in Kant's view of the relation between apperception and 
inner sense, a complication which relates directly to the problem of the 
'thing in itself.' 1 limit myself to the Aesthetic and Analytic of the first 
Critique; my aim is not to criticize Kant's views, nor to compare his 
sometimes equivocal formulations, but to give a coherent summary to 
which I believe Kant would subscribe. 
First, we must understand how Descartes' and Hume's problems 
arise, and how they relate to the question of the nature of self-knowledge. 
Descartes' Meditations typify the view of self-knowledge that 
characterized most pre-Kantian epistemology. For Descartes, 1 have 
immediate experience only of myself and what is 'in' me; from the sense-
impressions, or appearances, in my subjective sphere, I then infer that 
'outer' objects, or things in themselves, exist. This position clearly invites 
me to doubt whether such inferences about things outside me can ever be 
rationally justified; Descartes' own solution to this doubt relies on the 
goodness of God. For Descartes, self-knowledge, or the knowledge that 1 
exist, is the only knowledge that is certain to begin with. 
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Hume's skepticism takes a different tack: in An Inquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, sections IV and V, he claims that 
when we judge that events are necessarily connected as causes and 
effects, these judgments are merely mental habits without any rational 
justification. He argues, on the one hand, that the principle of cause and 
effect cannot be justified independently of experience, for truths that hold 
independently of experience must be tautologies; and since it is possible 
to imagine a world that would not conform to the principle of cause and 
effect, this principle is no tautology. On the other hand, the principle 
cannot be justified by experience, because this reasoning would be 
circular: all judgments from experience already rely on the principle. 
Hume concludes that any claims we make about things in the world are 
unjustified. To put it otherwise: for Hume, we can have self-knowledge, for 
we can make justified claims about what impressions we are having and 
about how our mind tends to connect them; but any claim about real 
connections among things themselves is untenable. Once again, we have 
a distinction between self-knowledge and knowledge of things 'outside' us. 
How, then, does Kant use his own conception of self-knowledge to 
refute Descartes and Hume? Before we can answer this question, we must 
see how Kant conceives of the self—and this in turn depends on how he 
conceives of knowledge. Kant's predecessors generally held that knowing 
was cither an essentially active or an essentially passive process; but Kant 
draws a fundamental distinction within the very process of knowing. For 
the rationalists, true knowing was active, in that it deduced all its 
conclusions from indubitable principles; for the empiricists, true knowing 
was passive, in that it depended wholly on what was given to us through the 
senses. But for Kant, the process of knowing is both active and passive. 
Knowing has two poles, the knower and the known; the knower actively 
produces concepts, which it applies to the intuitions, or appearances, it 
passively rcccivcs-and thus it makes them known. 
The dual nature of knowing implies that we can make valid claims 
to knowledge only if we do not exceed the bounds of experience, i.e. of 
"empirical knowledge" (B 147)1, which always includes both concepts and 
intuitions. As we have noted, in receiving intuitions the mind is passive, 
whereas in producing concepts the mind is spontaneous (A 51). Kant 
entitles the ability to receive intuitions the faculty of sensibility, and the 
ability to produce concepts the faculty of understanding. 
Kant's conception of knowledge is what leads him to distinguish 
two senses of the 'self.' We have seen that Kant conceives of the self as 
the knowcr-the active pole of the process of knowing. But the self can also 
* References arc to pages in the first (A) or second (B) edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, depending on where the passage first appeared; 
the translation is that of Norman Kemp Smith. 
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be an object of knowledge—and this is to say that it can be an object of 
experience, an object of empirical knowledge.^ 
How does the self become an object of empirical knowledge? 
Kant distinguishes two kinds of sensibility: 'outer sense' and 'inner sense.' 
Through outer sense we perceive "objects as outside us" in space, and 
through inner sense "the mind intuits itself or its inner state" in time (A 22). 
But according to Kant's conception of experience, inner and outer sense 
are fundamentally similar: both my experience of myself and my 
experience of other objects must depend on my receiving intuitions to 
which I apply concepts. Like knowledge of outer objects, any knowledge of 
my mind must have sensible intuitions as its content; and self-knowledge 
becomes objective and well-founded in applying concepts to these 
intuitions. Thus, for Kant, knowledge of the self is neither more nor less 
certain and immediate than any other empirical knowledge. We have no 
'intellectual intuition* of ourselves: intellectual intuition, or intuitive 
understanding (c/. B 135), would be a purely spontaneous knowledge, 
which would not depend on the ability to receive intuitions (B 68). To deny 
intellectual intuition of the self is, in traditional terms, to imply that the 
subjective and the objective spheres of knowledge are alike in kind: both 
depend on sensibility, and they establish truths not by penetrating to a 
thing in itself at all, but by connecting appearances under determinate 
rules. 
What, then, of the self that is the active pole of the process of 
knowing? Is it, too, an object of experience? For Kant, this cannot be. He 
conceives of the knowing self not as an object of knowledge at all, but as an 
ability: I must always be able to preface any piece of knowledge by '1 
think'-otherwisc, the knowledge would not belong to my experience. This 
capacity for self-consciousness, or 'apperception,' is completely different 
from inner sense, for it yields no intuition and no experience. '1 think,' or 'I 
am I,' cannot be considered knowledge. What Descartes called the cogilo 
turns out not to be an item of self-knowledge at all. 
But apperception plays a role in the Critique of Pure Reason that 
is as important as the role of the cogito in the Meditations: it is on 
apperception that Kant founds his refutation of Humean skepticism. To 
understand this refutation, we must consider Kant's notion that sensibility 
and understanding have 'forms.' 
2The ideas of reason include a further meaning of 'self or 'soul'; the idea of 
the soul as simple substance can be used as a regulative principle in 
psychology (A 682). Such ideas yield no knowledge proper, but we should 
not forget the crucial importance of non-cognitive ideas for Kant's thought 
as a whole. After all, Kant circumscribes the domain of knowledge in order 
to safeguard the ideas of a moral self and of freedom. 
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For Kant, sensibility and understanding operate according to 
particular rules, or 'forms'; and these forms are what give us 'synthetic a 
priori knowledge'—truths that are necessary, but not tautological. In the 
human mind, sensibility takes the forms of space and time, and 
understanding takes the forms of twelve 'categories' (which Kant divides 
into four groups). Space, time, and the categories are 'a priori concepts' (B 
xvii); they are the ways in which we constitute unified objects of experience 
that arc both intuited and thought. A priori concepts, says Kant, are 
conditions of possibility of experience; that is, any object we can know 
empirically must conform to the rules of sensibility and understanding. If 
we can know a priori that these concepts must apply to our experience, 
then we can have certain and substantive knowledge, synthetic a priori 
knowledge, about experience in general. 
If Kant is right, then Hume is mistaken in assuming that any 
necessary truths must be tautological; the principle of cause and effect is 
one of the categories, or synthetic a priori truths about experience. But 
how do we know that our understanding must have special rules? Why is 
it legitimate to expect all experience to conform to these rules, or 
categories? What function do these categories serve? Here is where Kant 
uses apperception to justify his epistemology. 
Kant argues in his 'Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" 
that it is the 'I think' that makes the categories apply necessarily and 
validly to all intuited objects. The i think' must be able to accompany all 
our representations; but it can do so only if these are brought together into 
a unitary experience—'my' experience. In fact, apperception is simply the 
unification of my experience; it has no content (B 135), but is, rather, a 
'function,' that is, the unity of an act of synthesis (c/. A 68). The categories, 
then, are nothing but the ways in which I thus synthesize intuited objects, 
fixing them within a spatio-temporal whole. Since representations cannot 
belong to my experience unless they are unified, all my knowledge must 
conform to the rules by which I unify. It is in this sense that Kant can call 
apperception the "supreme principle of all employment of the 
understanding" (B 136), and can even call the understanding the "faculty 
of apperception" (B 134, note). The 'I think' does not yield any knowledge 
in itself; but it makes all our knowledge possible. 
How does Kant's approach obviate Humcan skepticism? Hume 
had argued that the principle of cause and effect could never be proved 
from experience, for it already underlies all arguments from experience. 
But neither can the principle be proved independently of experience, for it 
is not a mere tautological 'relation of ideas.' Kant uses apperception as the 
basis for showing that not all a priori truths are tautologies. Apperception, 
and thus thinking in general, would be impossible if we were not able to 
connect appearances in relations such as cause and effect. These 
relations are thus nccessary-not as mere 'relations of ideas,' but as the 
glue that binds experience together and makes it someone's experience. 
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The way Kant deals with the second problem about our 
knowledge of the world is still more complex. Kant's answer to Descartes' 
skepticism about the existence of objects 'outside' me in general depends 
not only on apperception, but on the relation between apperception and 
inner sense. We have seen that the two 'selves' in Kant's epistemology 
must be kept distinct: the empirical self differs from the transcendental T 
of apperception. We fall into an illusion, a 'paralogism' of pure reason (B 
406ff.), if we treat apperception as an object of knowledge, and equate the 
function i think' with a soul about which we can make judgments. But 
though the empirical and transcendental selves are distinct, they 
nevertheless stand in a complex relation. We must now consider the 
details of how apperception interacts with inner sense when we apply the 
categories to intuitions; we can then understand Kant's doctrine that inner 
sense depends on outer sense, which constitutes his refutation of 
Cartesian skepticism. 
If we are to apply the categories to empirical objects, our mind 
must interpret the categories in terms of the particular forms of sensibility 
through which we intuit empirical objects. In other words, we must 
mediate between understanding and sensibility; there are rules for this 
mediation, rules which Kant calls 'schemata.' In his chapter on the 
schemata, Kant emphasizes the importance of time, the form of inner 
sense. For Kant, time is, as it were, the interpretive tool that inner sense 
provides us so that we can carry out the task set by apperception-the task 
of unifying our experience. The schemata, then, are procedures for 
forming 'images' of objects (A 140) which interpret the categories in terms 
of the objects' relation to time or their interrelation within time. Thus, in 
applying categories of 'quantity' to an object I count, successively adding 
one homogeneous unit to another and thus "generating time itself (A 
143). Categories of 'quality' are schematized in terms of "filling" time with a 
degree of sensation (A 145). Categories of 'modality,' including existence, 
are schematized in terms of "whether and how an object belongs to time" 
in general (whether it can enter our experience, and when) (A 145). Lastly, 
categories of 'relation' are schematized in images of objects as existing at 
different determinate times, at the same determinate time, or throughout 
all time. This last schema, which interprets the category of substance in 
terms of permanence, is crucial, for it provides a stable object in reference 
to which all other objects can be temporally determined (A 143 f.).3 But 
3l shall not dwell on these details of the schematism, but we can note that 
Kant's view of time is rather simple: time is a sequence of homogeneous 
moments which 1 generate through counting, and objects are either there 
or not there at each moment. A critic of Kant could question whether this 
account of time is sufficient to characterize our experience of the self and 
the world. 
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here, inner sense needs outer sense: in order to complete the task of 
unification, we require not only time but spacc-and this will form the basis 
of Kant's refutation of Descartes. 
As our next step towards understanding Kant's argument against 
Cartesian skepticism, we must look more closely at what Kant means by 
'determination,' and at his claim that time alone is insufficient for this 
determination. Kant refers to the schemata as "a priori determinations of 
time" (A 145). The unity of apperception requires these schemata in order 
to effect "the determination of appearances in space and time in general" 
(B 168f.). We use the schematized categories to determine objects within a 
coherent experiential whole; in other words, in order to unify our 
experience, we must assign to each element of experience a definite 
moment within a single temporal sequence, and a definite place within a 
single spatial structure. 
Now, we might ask whether intuitions do not already present 
themselves as unified and determined, thanks merely to the fact that 
inner sense has a particular form, namely time. Is spatial determination 
also necessary for coherent experience? Is it not enough to fit our 
experiences into a temporal sequence, a 'stream of consciousness'? 
Anticipating this thought, Kant stresses that inner sense alone is incapable 
of determining objects: "Inner sense...contains the mere form of intuition, 
but without combination of the manifold in it, and therefore so far contains 
no determinate intuition" (B 154). Inner sense is simply a "limiting 
condition" on how I must intuit myself (B 159); it is not a sufficient 
condition for determining objects. Time indeed contains certain 'relations' 
of representations (A 33, B 67), but these relations are not ordered enough 
to let us have knowledge. The contents of time are "in constant flux" (B 
291); "perceptions come together only in accidental order, so that no 
necessity determining their connection is or can be revealed in the 
perceptions themselves" (B 219). If Kant is right, all this means that if we 
attempted to consider our experience only as a temporal succession of 
perceptions in our mind, we would be isolating it from what makes 
experience objective, i.e. knowable and coherent. 
But why does time alone fail to make our experience knowable? 
The answer is that for Kant, objects can be determined only in relation to 
something permanent, and permanence can be found only in space. 
Kant's first account of inner sense may suggest that some experiences-
abstract meditations in my mind, perhaps-can take place without the 
medium of outer sense. But Kant also says that "all thought must, directly 
or indirectly, by way of certain characters lor criteria, Merkmate], relate 
ultimately to intuitions" (B 33). Inner intuitions alone do not present us 
with the 'criteria' that would allow us to relate our thoughts adequately to 
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them; inner intuitions cannot be determined under the categories, 
because determination requires sensible permanence (B 291). We might 
have thought that this sensible permanence was already given us by the 
schema of substance, as an object existing throughout all time; but Kant 
denies that time alone can present us with permanence. To be sure, says 
Kant, time itself is "non-transitory and abiding" as the form which inner 
sense must always take (A 143); "time, however, cannot itself be perceived" 
(A 177). An empty time cannot be sensed; it is unimaginable (though not 
inconceivable), because not time itself, but only things in time can enter 
our experience (A 188). Through inner sense, then, we sense only 
perceptions within time—and these are "in constant flux": "in inner sense 
no permanent intuition is to be met with" (B 292). The result is that we 
must relate inner sense to outer sense, in which there can be perceivable 
permanence; only then can we determine objects under the categories, for 
this involves fixing them in relation to such permanence. Objects in space 
are independent of the mere sequence of our mental states; they can thus 
provide us with lasting points of reference, landmarks to which we can 
apply 'criteria' in accordance with the schematized categories. 
Kant cannot mean that we depend on perceiving some particular 
spatial object which is indestructible; his point is, rather, that it is only as 
belonging to an 'outer,' spatial world that objects can be treated as 
independent of our own momentary perceptions. And we must treat 
objects as persisting independently of our stream of consciousness, in 
order to use them as landmarks by which we measure a unified sequence 
of time. As we assign our experiences a place in a single sequence, we 
apply criteria to these landmarks, and use them as stable elements against 
which we can plot the sequence of our own, unstable perceptions. Objects 
in space allow us to measure and determine objects in general, and thus to 
make them compatible with the unity of apperception. Outer sense is 
hence a condition of possibility of all experience-even 'inner' experience. 
We are now ready to understand Kant's "Refutation of Idealism"-
-by which he means "the problematic idealism of Descartes, which holds 
that there is only one empirical assertion that is indubitably certain, 
namely, that 'I am'" (B 274). Here Kant establishes that the knowledge of 
my own existence already implies "the existence of objects in space 
outside me" (B 275). For Kant, existence is a category; when we think that a 
thing exists, we schematize this category in terms of inner sense, and we 
think that the thing is present "in some determinate time" (A 145). But as 
we have seen, we cannot determine time unless we refer to something 
permanent, which can be intuited only in space. Hence "inner experience 
in general is possible only through outer experience in general" (B 278). 
Here Kant has used his views of knowledge, the self, and self-
knowledge to give a radically new sense to the 'inner and outer spheres' of 
his philosophical predecessors. For Kant, it is hopeless to attempt to know 
myself (or my 'inner' perceptions) independently of knowing other objects, 
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the objects perceived in these perceptions: unless I know objects in space, 
I cannot determine myself as a unified object, and thus I cannot even 
assert my own existence. In other words, it is an allusion to think that I can 
know about my 'representations' without knowing about any of the objects 
that I represent. I am immediately conscious of "a thing outside me and 
not...the mere representation of a thing outside me" (B 275). 'Inner sense' 
is indeed the sense by which I intuit myself and my inner state (A 22); but 
this intuition cannot rise to the status of knowledge unless it meshes with 
my 'outer sense' of things other than I. Kant still uses the words 'inner' and 
'outer* here, spatial terms, simply because space is the form in which we 
arc given objects other than ourselves; in Kant's hands, these terms no 
longer imply that we are locked into our consciousness as if into a prison 
cell. 
We have now seen how Kant uses the two sides of self-
knowlcdgc—apperception and inner sense-to counter Humean and 
Cartesian skepticism. But in order completely to understand the role that 
self-knowledge plays in Kant, we must touch upon a complication-a point 
in the Critique that relates to deeper questions, questions that I believe 
Kant did not work out thoroughly. 
Kant wishes to allow for an 'existence' prior to the category of 
existence, so that it can be said in some sense that the T of apperception 
exists. He also speaks as if the distinction between transcendental and 
empirical self were founded in a deeper identity. Despite the difference 
between the mere thought "that I am" (B157), which is unitary and purely 
spontaneous, and the knowable self which is determined in a complex 
world, the two selves are identified as "the same subject" (B 155): inner 
intuition is, after all, "self-intuition" (B 157, note). Because of this 
identification of the transcendental with the empirical self, we cannot say 
simply that the latter exists and the former docs not; there must be a sense 
in which existence is "already given" (though not yet determined under the 
categories) in the i think.' "The 'I think' expresses the act of determining 
my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I 
am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not 
thereby given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required" (B 157, 
note; my emphasis). Kant conceives of this existence given in the 'I think' 
as "an indeterminate empirical intuition"; it is "something real [i.e., 
something that is, and which "corresponds to a sensation in general," A 
1431 that is given...to thought in general"—but this real something is not 
given "as appearance," and "precedes the experience which is required to 
determine the object of perception through the category in respect of 
time" (B 422 f., note). The Critique insufficiently explores this vague 
conception of a "being itself \das Ylesen selbstj" that is prior to any 
determinate mode of intuition (B 429). Yet the conception springs from 
the very idea of inner sense as the mode in which we intuit ourselves, for 
this implies an identity of the knowcr with the existent known, and thus an 
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existence of the knower—which nevertheless cannot yet be the 
determinate existence of the known. 
This point brings us to the last issue 1 would like to consider: the 
relation between self-knowledge and the famous problem of the 'thing in 
itself.' We have seen that Kant's double conception of self-knowledge, as 
apperception and inner sense, springs from his double conception of 
knowledge itself, as knower and known. We can characterize both knower 
and known negatively: the knower as such can never be an object of 
knowledge, and the known is always an appearance, never a thing in itself. 
There is a fascinating symmetry here. We have just heard Kant insist that 
the knower is "the being itsclf'-an existence of which we are aware, yet 
about which we cannot make judgments, for Kant's doctrine of inner sense 
implies that the knower can know even itself "only as appearance, not as it 
is in itself (D 156). He insists, symmetrically, that although we can know 
nothing about the thing in itself, we must at least think it, as that which 
appears in appearances (B xxvi f.). This leaves us with the question of how 
we are to think the relation of knower in itself to thing in itself. The 
unprovable suggestion of the first Critique, which is further explored in 
Kant's moral and aesthetic writings, is that the subject in itself and the 
object in itself can be the same. 
